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“Endless Forms” of Evolution? Heuristics in Darwin and Taine. 
 
Andrew Court, University of Edinburgh. 
 
I. Misinterpretations of Darwin 
1959 was the centenary year of the publication of The Origin of Species. Literary critic 
and Darwin scholar Morse Peckham wrote a review of the impact of Darwin’s theory on 
work in the humanities, for a special issue of the Victorian Studies journal. Coming to 
the conclusion that much of what had been attributed to Darwin’s legacy was in fact 
spuriously based on the Darwin found in the pages of the Originthat it was not 
Darwinian at all, but merely “Darwinistic”—Peckham declared that it was “indeed to be 
expected, that the history of the impact of Darwinism should principally have been a 
history of rejection or misinterpretation” (33). 
 A further forty-eight years have passed since Peckham wrote these words, and even 
now what characterises the history of Darwinismat least in its literary guisesare 
these dual facets of rejection or misinterpretation. But while the important entries in the 
literary discussion of Darwinism that resulted in an out-and-out rejection were written 
mainly in the mid-twentieth centuryan article by René Wellek written three years 
before Peckham’s piece is prominent here, and will be examined shortlythere is now 
renewed interest in the application of evolutionary ideas to literary studies. 
 The central text of this new wave is Joseph Carroll’s Evolution and Literary Theory 
(1995), and in the last few years the publication record of the new evolutionary critics 
has been expanding steadily.1 These critics are arguing that Darwin’s ideas ought to be 
fundamental to our conceptions of what literature is and what literature does, and with 
mutual admiration extending between the evolutionary critics and such iconic 
Darwinians as E. O. Wilson, it would be derisible indeed to suggest there is any kind of 
rejection of Darwinism going on here. (That there may be a continuing rejection of 
scientific approaches to humanistic studies more generally is another story.)  
 But what about misinterpretation, Peckham’s second charge? In Evolution and 
Literary Theory Carroll finds a precedent for his own position in Hippolyte Taine’s 
History of English Literature (1863–64). I will be suggesting that Carroll then proceeds 
to misrepresent not just Taine but Darwin, too, by making a bold argument for Taine’s 
                                                     
1 E.g., Storey, Carroll 2004, Barash & Barash, and Gottschall & Wilson. 
Darwinism. Like the simple beginnings of life that Darwin imagined in the closing 
passage of the Origin, his theory itself seems to have spawned “endless forms” (Darwin 
1959:759). 
 I hope to suggest that what connects a position like René Wellek’s mid twentieth-
century rejection of evolutionary ideas in literary history with Carroll’s much more 
recent misinterpretation of what is Darwinian in Taine is, in both cases, a failure to 
provide an adequate account of the methods for historical inquiry outlined by such 
writers as Taine. I suggest that to make a claim for a theoretical approach (biological, 
historical, literary-critical, or what-have-you) being Darwinian (rather than merely 
“Darwinistic”) one must draw parallels at the methodological level.2 
 
II. Wellek, Analogy Rejected 
 
First, an examination of Wellek’s essay, entitled “The Concept of Evolution in Literary 
History” (1956). Here, Wellek worked chronologically through the various instances of 
what he called “evolutionism” in literary criticism and literary theory, from the 
Renaissance and neo-classical adoption of Aristotelian teleological thinking to Jan 
Mukařovský’s attempt to combine an historical approach with formalist notions of 
autonomy in his work on the “transformation” of poetic “relations” (654, 658–9). There 
appears to have been scope in Wellek’s survey for a large number of kinds of 
“evolution,” but the use in his title of the term “concept” in the singular is perhaps not 
misleading once it is realised that what unified these various incarnations, for Wellek, 
was the mismatch between actual historical processeswhat Wellek had elsewhere 
called “concrete process” or “true history” (e.g., Wellek 1941:21, 82)and any attempt 
to provide some explanatory purchase through an evolutionary theory about them. 
 But there was a more significant fudging of terms by Wellek than whether or not 
what counted was a plural or a singular “concept.” I think it most instructive to focus on 
what Wellek wrote here about late nineteenth-century literary historians. For Wellek, 
Herbert Spencer’s 1857 essay on “Progress: Its Law and Cause” first “suggested how 
the development of literature could be conceived in terms of a law of progression from 
the simple to the complex” (Wellek 1956:655). Spencer’s essay predated Darwin’s 
Origin of Species by two years, but as far as Wellek was concerned the almost 
simultaneous working out of an evolutionary doctrine by Darwin and Spencer produced 
something of a conceptual entanglement in the work of anyone influenced by the 
evolutionary point of view after 1859. Spencer’s theory appeared first, and when 
Darwin published the Origin two years later, his theory was held by contemporaries 
(according to Wellek’s argument) to be entirely of a piece with Spencer’s. 
 At the time, Darwin was actually at pains to point out how his theory of biological 
evolution did not recognise the metaphysical progression or teleology implied in 
Spencer’s doctrine of cosmological evolution.3 But what is perhaps more curious is that 
even in 1956 the conceptual entanglement was still present, prompting Wellek to 
provide a template to retroactively distinguish the influence of Darwin or Spencer on 
different practitioners. Spencer’s influence was the greater of the two, Wellek claimed, 
and thus the proviso that “[e]volutionism should be called Darwinian only when it 
implies the mechanistic explanation of the process (which was Darwin’s special 
contribution) and when it uses such ideas as ‘survival of the fittest,’ ‘natural selection,’ 
‘transformation of species’” (655). This might have been less confusing had Wellek 
provided some examples of kinds of “evolutionism” that met his prescription. Darwin’s 
was certainly not the only theory of species “transformation” going in the nineteenth-
century, and the phrase “survival of the fittest,” introduced in the fifth edition of the 
origin in an attempt to clarify some confusions about the term “natural selection,” was 
actually taken from Spencer, and thus hardly could serve its purpose as a means of 
differentiating him from Darwin!4 
 But Wellek did not name a single example of a Darwinian literary “evolutionism” 
that fitted his template successfully. All attempts to use biological arguments in theories 
of literary history, he found, were characterised by a misguided application of biological 
analogies to historical phenomena. There could be no Darwinian “evolutionism” in 
literary theory because Darwin’s “special contribution” did not suit the study materials. 
What was really damning for Wellek about evolution in literary history was that would-
be evolutionary critics argued from analogy. His article catalogued the failures of every 
                                                                                                                                                           
2 Carroll’s book is detailed and nuanced, and my disagreement about his use of Taine does not call his 
larger argument fundamentally into question. 
3 For a general discussion of the differences, doctrinal and influential, between Darwin and Spencer, see 
Bowler. 
4 Darwin’s work was preceded by the evolutionary theory of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, and actually retained 
some parts of Lamarck’s mechanism. Robert Chambers’ pseudo-scientific and notorious Vestiges of 
Natural History was published in 1844. See Bowler for discussions. Peckham’s introduction to his 
variorum edition of the Origin (Darwin 1959) provides an excellent discussion of the differences between 
editions. See page 22 for the reference to Spencer’s phrase. 
evolutionary argument from analogy that he encounteredfailures, that is, not 
necessarily for being inadequately Darwinian, but for failing to account for those key 
words for Wellek, “true history” or “concrete process,” in historical explanation. 
Despite his criteria for distinguishing Darwinian from Spencerian influence in literary 
thinking, both were similarly “false when applied to literature.” Literary works were not 
organisms. The product of this misconceived mating of ideas, wrote Wellek, was an 
attempt to argue analogically from categories alien to literary history (659–60). 
 In fact, there was some sleight of hand in Wellek’s conclusions about biological 
analogising. As we shall see, what was crucial to the efforts of late nineteenth-century 
literary historians to apply scientific theories to the historical study of literature (in 
Taine, J. A. Symonds, Ferdinand Brunetière, H. M. Posnett, among others) was an 
analogy drawn between scientific and historiographical methods. Wellek despatched 
terminological analogies in historical explanation, and with the same flourish dismissed 
the methodological analogy without consideration. He provided no sustained discussion 
of the methodological consequences of using biological analogies, and did not look 
closely in his essay at the explanations such men as Taine, Symonds, and Posnett gave 
for their preoccupation with science.  
 In the remaining sections, I wish to consider why a particular type of scientific 
methodology might have appealed to these men when they came to write up their 
literary histories. I take Taine as my example, and consider why Darwin’s theory, as 
presented in The Origin of Species, might have had particular methodological appeal for 
Taine, and why Wellek’s rejection of analogy was an inadequate response. I wish to 
propose that there is a better evaluative criterion by which to adjudge the “Darwinian” 
content of late nineteenth-century literary historiography than Wellek’s isolation of a 
mechanistic “special contribution,” and that my criterion goes some way to disqualify 
Carroll’s recent attempt to characterise Taine as Darwinian.  
 
III. Darwin’s Analogy, Controversy and Justification 
 
In light of Wellek’s massive contribution to historical studies in literature, it might seem 
dubious to argue that what was missing in Wellek’s account of “evolutionism” was an 
important historical component. But while he stressed that traces of Darwin’s “special 
contribution” to evolutionary thinking could not be found in late nineteenth-century 
literary histories, and that their analogical arguments were, moreover, simply “false,” 
Wellek does not seem to have been at all aware that a debate about the role of 
analogical argument in science broke out immediately upon the publication of the 
Origin. This argument is assuredly relevant to Wellek’s discussion of the validity of 
analogy, and must therefore be taken into account. 
 This is not a whimsical diversion from the promised discussion of literary 
historiography. Without being clear about what I think were the aspects of Darwin’s 
theory that were attractive to literary historians, there is no chance of improving on 
Wellek’s claims, nor arguing for a particular kind of Darwinian influence on men like 
Taine. 
 In presenting his theory of natural selectionwhich for Wellek, we recall, was part 
of Darwin’s “special contribution”Darwin relied on an analogy between selection in 
domestic breeding and selection in nature. This analogy was presented in chapter four of 
the Origin.5 In domestic or artificial selection, wrote Darwin, great changes were 
observed to be obtained by a breeder’s selection of desired traits in, say, cattle or sheep. 
Variations between individual animals regularly arose, and breeders could reasonably 
be assured of success in selecting for desirable traits because of the fact that variations 
were often inherited by offspring. Variation of traits and inheritance of variations were 
not the work of the breeder. Only the act of selection was (and its corollary, the 
destruction of animals exhibiting undesirable traits). Darwin pointed out that variation 
and inheritance also were observed in nature, outside the remit of domestic breeding. 
Given this parallel between observations of breeding in agriculture and observations of 
populations of animals in nature, Darwin posed the question of whether there might be a 
process of selection in nature analogous to that observed in domestic breeding. He 
answered in the affirmative, and called this analogous process “natural selection” (163–
4). 
 Not everyone was happy with this result, nor the means by which it was obtained, 
with the dissent often latching onto the very issue of analogy. Reviews printed in the 
months after Darwin’s book was published claimed that his argument from analogy did 
not amount to a scientific theory. Darwin had not proved natural selection to be a law of 
nature, said his reviewers, because his argument from analogy was insufficiently 
inductive. Inductive reasoning required the collection of a vast number of facts, from 
                                                     
5 Darwin used a different analogy, that of “ten thousand sharp wedges packed close together and driven 
inwards by incessant blows” in chapter three of the Origin, while developing his argument about the 
which regularities and laws could be generalised. Instead, Darwin’s reviewers found 
him to have jumped to conclusions about a scientific law (natural selection) in the 
opening chapters of the Origin, and then used his theory to explain the facts. In lieu of a 
rigorous inductive procedure, the analogy was not accepted as proof of the theory 
advanced. This rejection of Darwin’s argument, in many cases by other scientists, went 
on for over seven years and five editions of the Origin.6 
 But the reviewers filing these negative reports on Darwin’s theory appear to have 
overlooked a number of important philosophical works on scientific method, written 
before the Origin, in which the use of analogical arguments in science had been 
mandated. Books by John F. W. Herschel, William Whewell, and J. S. Mill contained 
justifications for analogical reasoning and argument in scientific discovery and 
explanation. These books were written in the 1830s and ’40s, crucial decades for 
Darwin. The Origin was not published until November 1859, but it was in the closing 
years of the ’30s that Darwin’s inquiries into what he then called the “transmutation 
question” built up pace. Darwin was familiar with these books on scientific method.7 
His reviewers, on the other hand, were notor by 1860, when the reviews of Darwin’s 
Origin began appearing, had forgotten that they were.  
 That there was some philosophical mandate for Darwin’s use of analogy does not 
single-handedly explain why Darwin needed to use this style of argument. His reasons 
are considered in the next section, where I argue that Darwin’s method was 
“hypothetico-deductive,” not inductive; that he had to argue from analogy because 
certain parts of his mechanism were scientific unknowns, for which there was no theory; 
and that the presentation of his theory mirrored his process of discovery, giving a clue to 
its mode of influence. But already it seems possible to suggest that a point can be scored 
easily against Wellek simply by taking this historical point (philosophical mandate of 
analogy) into consideration. Furthermore, a considerable amount of the scientific 
controversy after 1859 centred on Darwin’s use of analogy, suggesting that this was as 
characteristic of his argument as the “mechanistic explanation” itself.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
“struggle for existence,” but it is the selection analogy in the chapter on natural selection which I 
concentrate on here. 
6 For a survey and discussion of the contemporary scientific responses to Darwin’s work on evolution, see 
Hull 1973. All discussion in this essay regarding Darwin’s contemporary reviewers is based on Hull’s 
collection, unless alternative citations are given. 
IV. “Heuristic Support” in Darwin 
 
Why did Darwin use an argument from analogy to develop the centrepiece of his book, 
the theory of natural selection? In the face of critical reviews focusing on his style of 
argument and declaring it to be unscientific, why did Darwin not provide compelling 
(inductive) arguments in later editions of the Origin? Were there better evidence and 
stronger arguments for his theory than the successes of domestic and agricultural 
breeding, or not? 
 In short, the answer is that Darwin realised that inductive reasoning was not 
adequate to the development of new theories in sciencenot the theory he was looking 
for, anyway. Instead, Darwin’s method was “hypothetico-deductive,” a term used in 
twentieth-century philosophy of science to describe a procedure whereby, rather than 
relying on an induction from facts to laws, the scientist starts by conjecturing an 
hypothesis, a law, a theory, or an axiom, and then brings facts to bear on the conjecture 
as a test for whether it is, or is not, supported by observation. In hypothetico-
deductivism, the relationship between facts and observation is reversed (see Ghiselin for 
a discussion of hypothetico-deductivism in Darwin). 
 There were strong historical precedents for Darwin’s position, but given that Isaac 
Newton was the paradigmatic scientist in the eyes of nineteenth-century thinkers, and 
that Darwin wrote that he wanted to be the Newton of biology (Ruse, 166, 175), his is 
perhaps the most significant example.  
 Starting in 1860, Darwin was criticised for not establishing the precise causes of 
variation and inheritanceprocesses upon which his theory dependedbefore 
publishing. Lacking this causal basis, Darwin’s theory in the Origin was dismissed by 
some as hypothetical speculation. Darwin’s reviewers claimed that he had invented an 
hypothesis by espousing natural selection, and inventing hypotheses was strictly 
forbidden by Newton, for whom scientific theories had to arise from observed 
phenomena only: non hypotheses fingo. 
 But it must be pointed out here that Newton himself was not particularly Newtonian 
in this regard, at least not as “Newtonian” as some nineteenth-century interpreters 
would have liked him to have been. This lowers the threshold by which the 
“Newtonian” content of scientific theories (Darwin’s, say) ought to have been 
                                                                                                                                                           
7 See Ruse for a discussion of the influence of Herschel, Whewell, and Mill on Darwin’s research. 
measured, making the “Newtonian test” of theories worthless unless an accurate picture 
emerged about Newton’s own procedure. 
 In fact, Darwin provided just such a picture. In response to the allegation that he 
hypothesised in a manner unbefitting a follower of Newton, Darwin argued that 
Newton’s own theory of optics involved invention. “I should really much like to know,” 
wrote Darwin in a letter to the Cambridge botanist John Henslow, “why such an 
hypothesis as the undulations of the ether may be invented [by Newton], & why I may 
not invent (not that I did invent it, for I was led to it by studying domestic varieties) any 
hypothesis, such as natural selection” (Barlow 204). In another letter, this time to 
Heinrich Bronn, the first German translator of the Origin, Darwin pointed out that just 
because the precise nature of electricity was not known by scientists studying it, did not 
mean that they ought to forfeit on ever developing an exact science of electrical 
phenomena (Darwin & Seward 1:172–3).  
 Hence it is possible to draw the conclusion that Darwin’s use of analogy was 
justified by nineteenth-century philosophers of science, and his hypothetico-deductive 
approach was, in his eyes, perfectly Newtonian. But this still does not explain the 
necessity of Darwin’s approach. 
 Although variations and their inheritance had been documented extensively by 
naturalists and breeders in the nineteenth century, there simply was no causal 
explanation ofno scientific theory aboutvariation and inheritance when Darwin was 
developing his theory of evolution. Put baldly, there was no theory of genetics in the 
nineteenth-century. Did this mean that Darwin ought to have waited for a theory of 
genetics before publishing the Origin? As it turned out, this would have meant waiting 
more than forty years: the significance of Gregor Mendel’s experiments was not 
“discovered” by the world of science until 1900 (Bowler 256). By the time Darwin 
started writing the Origin, he had already been working on his theory for over twenty-
two years. He died in 1882. Even Darwin could see that time was of the essence: Alfred 
Wallace, a British naturalist working in the Malay Archipelago, had hit upon the same 
selective mechanism as Darwin, and sent Darwin a report for his considerationnews 
which necessitated something of a rush into print (Gruber 28)! 
 But there was no need to wait. Darwin dealt with the unknown causal nature of the 
mechanism of transmutation by arguing from analogy, a procedure justified by 
philosophers of science. The fact that he had no causal explanation of the forces at work 
(variation, inheritance) mattered little. In light of Herschel and Whewell’s remarks on 
scientific method, it was this lack of causal knowledge that necessitated Darwin’s use of 
analogy. He could posit, and feel scientifically justified in doing so, a selective 
mechanism in nature analogous to that of the agricultural breeder.8 
 To put this another way, the analogical argument from artificial to natural selection 
provided heuristic support for Darwin. It was heuristic in the sense that it solved his 
problem, a problem about the limitations in scientific knowledge about the causes of 
inheritance and variation in animals and plants, and how to work around these 
limitations. Contrary to Wellek’s assertion that the “mechanistic explanation” itself 
exclusively was to be considered Darwin’s “special contribution,” and building on a 
suggestion made by Michael Ghiselin about Darwin’s method (Ghiselin 236), I propose 
that it was Darwin’s scientific demonstration of the heuristic support of analogical 
argument that was central to his legacy in the late nineteenth century. 
 Obviously, Darwin was not the first writer, scientific or otherwise, to rely on 
analogical argument. To suggest that it was analogy alone that characterised Darwin’s 
theory would thus be a risible basis for any claim about demonstrable influence. Nor is 
it enough to suggest that each and every kind of “evolutionism” after 1859 must have 
been in some way Darwinian, the result of an evolutionary Zeitgeist in the late 
nineteenth century. It may have “rained, hailed, and poured theories of life” in the 
1800s, but suggesting that the idea of evolution itself is the important consideration in 
tracing influence would merely restate this bald and rather tired fact.9 
 I wish to make two additional points to back my argument for “heuristic support” 
being the critical factor in considering Darwin’s influence on literary historians. Then it 
will be possible to test this hypothesis in the next section. 
 Firstly, positing natural selection did not miraculously serve up causal theories of 
variation and inheritance. Darwin knew that a scientific audience would be aware of the 
data on agricultural breeding, and may have realised that presenting his theory by using 
the same analogy that had led him to it would be the best way of getting his theory 
across to his readers. The analogy was left in the Origin, even though this resulted in 
lending the concept of “natural selection” some anthropomorphic overtones (the notion 
of an intelligent selective “agent” in nature). Darwin considered divesting his theory of 
                                                     
8 In fact, Whewell’s discussion of “consilience” in science, a “jumping together” of different “classes of 
facts,” strengthened the philosophical mandate for Darwin’s analogy, as well as arguably making it 
appear to Darwin that his theory was likely to be true. See Ruse 163–4. Darwin’s next major theoretical 
work was a book on the Variation of Plants and Animals Under Domestication (1868) in which he put 
forward his theory of “pangenesis” as a tentative causal explanation of inheritance. 
its metaphorical implications, but beyond adding a caveat to the third edition of his 
book, to the effect that the phrase “natural selection” was inherently metaphorical, the 
analogy stayed (Darwin 165). Despite its earlier philosophical and historical 
justification, Darwin’s procedure has in fact been declared an innovation in scientific 
theorising by historians (e.g., Manier 172–3). 
 A related, second point is that the idea of “heuristic support” addresses not only the 
role of analogical argument in Darwin’s process of discovery (his realisation that there 
was a selective force in nature of the same kind as that in the domestic sphere), it also 
suggests how this role overlaps with that of his reader. If, as suggested in the last 
paragraph, Darwin’s heuristic support for discovery was left in the Origin, it provides a 
clue as to how that theory might be used as heuristic support for other types of inquiry, 
by thinkers familiar with the Origin (Ghiselin 236).  
 In fact, the criterion of “heuristic support” can be used to evaluate the Darwinian 
content of other thinkers’ work. It should be clear from the preceding discussion that 
what must be demonstrated is that Taine relied on “heuristic support” in his literary 
historiography. This is the task of the next section. 
 
V. “Heuristic Support” in Taine 
 
At first glance, there is scant evidence in Taine for a direct borrowing from Darwin. In 
roughly a thousand pages on the history of English literature there is but the one 
footnote mentioning Darwin (1:10). Does this make the attempt to claim the influence 
of Darwin on Taine futile? 
 I think not. As I argued in the previous section, Darwin’s presentation of his theory 
in the Origin is key to establishing his likely influence on later writers (as opposed to 
the general “influence” of an evolutionary Zeitgeist or a generalised evolutionary 
doctrine). In lieu of chancing upon statements by literary historians writing after 1859 
that they followed the debate about Darwin’s argument closely or indeed communicated 
with Darwin or other scientists, that influence must have been taken from the book they 
are most likely to have read: The Origin of Species. What was clear in that book about 
Darwin’s process of discovery was the heuristic function of the argument from analogy.  
 But it is not only Darwin’s process of discovery that must be considered. As I have 
                                                                                                                                                           
9 The meteorological allusion was made by Samuel Haughton, in his review of the Origin. See Hull 223. 
suggested, there is another process of discovery to account for—that undertaken by 
readers of the Origin. The heuristic use of analogy in Darwin’s book was meant to 
persuade scientific readers of the truth of his theory despite certain mechanisms 
remaining unknown in detail. It was meant to persuade, and to appeal to the 
understanding. The analogy in the Origin effectively linked Darwin’s own 
understanding of his theory and the reader’s comprehension of the theory’s usefulness, 
providing heuristic support for his own process of discovery, and for the understanding 
of his book by readers. In Darwin’s mind, the theory had assumed a particular “shape,” 
and by keeping the analogy which led his to his theory in its published version, that 
“shape” was described clearly to readers.10 This, I propose, is how one man’s process of 
discovery might have influenced others who read his work. 
 The hypothesis to be tested, then, is this: that the “shape” of Taine’s theory in 
History of English Literature is the same as that of Darwin’s theory. 
 There are three steps in the test. Firstly, I summarise Taine’s theory in brief outline, 
concentrating on his presentation in the theoretical introduction to History of English 
Literature. Secondly, I counter Carroll’s claim that Taine was a “biological 
determinist,” or indeed that Taine was “evolutionary” in the default sense that to think 
in non-evolutionary terms in the late nineteenth century was a practical impossibility. 
Thirdly, I show that Taine’s theory in the History was congruent at the explanatory, 
methodological level with Darwin’s theory in the Origin; that is, that Taine used the 
same kind of heuristic support to overcome procedural problems similar to Darwin’s. 
 (1.) The three words everyone who has ever come across Taine remembers about 
him are race, milieu, and moment (or race, surroundings, and epoch, for those who got 
their Taine from H. van Laun’s Edinburgh English translation). These are Taine’s three 
categories for providing an explanation of the relationship of cultural productions 
(literature, for example) to racial, climatic, and sociological conditions. For Taine, each 
of his three terms was one of a set of “motive forces” which produced a given work or 
“document” by acting in unison. “Race,” or “innate and hereditary dispositions,” 
accounted for “marked differences in the temperament and structure of the body” and 
resulted in “a natural variety of men, as of oxen and horses.” For Taine this was the 
most important of his “motive forces,” the other two resulting in “deviations” from its 
                                                     
10 That the theory had a “shape” intrinsic to it is testified to by the fact that Darwin was unable to remove 
the metaphorical and analogical content from any of the future editions of the Origin, despite his 
influence (1:10). “Milieu” accounted for geographical and climatic conditions, 
influencing such things as “the inventions of science, letters, and arts.” The arts and 
sciences were invented by the Greeks, wrote Taine, because they occupied a landscape 
conducive to such “social ways” (1:12). The third component in Taine’s theory is 
“moment.” He appears to have felt less need to clearly define this concept. At first, 
moment appears to be no more than a combination of the other two terms (1:12). But as 
we shall see, moment was not only crucial to Taine’s historiography, but also key to a 
comparison of Taine with Darwin.  
 (2.) Joseph Carroll, citing Taine as a precedent for his own position in Evolution and 
Literary Theory, holds that only the first two of Taine’s terms, race and milieu, really 
matter. In order to bring out the “biological determinist” that Carroll sees lurking in 
Taine he suggests thinking of Taine’s race and milieu in terms of the Darwin-inflected 
“species” or “heredity” and “environment” (Carroll 1995:39, 16–7; 2004:46). 
 While Taine did gloss “race” as “innate and hereditary dispositions,” he also 
described it as a “permanent impulse” (1:12) and there is little to suggest that he thought 
of it in real Darwinian terms—as the inheritability of structural and behavioural 
variations, rather than an inalterable, eternal genetic legacy, only changing in expression 
when forced by circumstance, never in essence. For example, he wrote that three 
hundred years after the Norman invasiona critical moment in the development of an 
English language and literature for Tainethe original Saxon character of the English 
prevailed and reasserted itself over the Latin influences of the invaders (1:56–7). The 
idea of change as something internal and built in to all life, as inevitable but random, as 
something requiring a strictly biological evolutionary explanation is, I contend, 
completely absent in Taine. By dismissing the concept of moment, because it “merely 
signifies the cultural environment in its temporal aspect” (16), Carroll sees fit to provide 
a dubious translation of Taine’s remaining concepts into a Darwinian lexicon, thus 
overlooking the significance of Taine’s third term. 
 Hence I claim that Taine was not “evolutionary” in the Darwinian sensethat his 
theory is not influenced by the “idea” or “doctrine” of evolution as such. Trying to 
argue that Taine was a “biological determinist” is about as worthwhile as Wellek’s 
provision of a template for distinguishing between Darwin and Spencer. The question is 
beside the point, which is to trace influence at the methodological level. This can only 
                                                                                                                                                           
awareness that this content was responsible for some of the arguments against his theory. See Manier 
be accomplished by looking more closely at the “moment” concept. 
 (3.) Taine described “moment” as “the acquired momentum” resulting from the 
relationship of “race” and “milieu” (1:12). Although at first this equation appears to 
support Carroll’s claim, since it was contained in or merely the result of the first two, 
Taine’s conception was crucial. We must consider what Taine hoped to explain by using 
this concept. He wrote that when reflecting on the characteristics of succeeding 
historical periods, it was apparent that the “dominant idea” of each period could not 
exist in complete independence from those dominant ideas of the periods which led up 
to it. Each “idea” (the Hegelian overtones are fairly obvious) “depends in part upon the 
first,” which, in conjunction with the effects of “race” and “surrounding circumstances” 
(milieu), “imposes on each new creation its bent and direction” (1:12). This, for Taine, 
was the basic historiographical problem: how to explain the causes of historical 
phenomena and the relationship of seemingly distinct historical periods.  
 Taine then went on to suggest that this was “but a mechanical problem.” The reader 
might have prepared for an argument along the lines of a physical explanation of 
historical phenomena. Not quite. Taine wrote that the problem in history was not the 
same as the problem in the physical sciences. Rather, while there was a similarity, 
perhaps a parallel justifying an analogy with problems in the physical sciences, there 
was no identity between physics and history. “The only difference which separates these 
moral problems from physical ones is, that the magnitude and direction cannot be 
valued or computed in the first as in the second” (1:13). By “magnitude and direction” 
Taine appears to have meant the forces which historical formations of the past brought 
to bear upon the present, or the historical period under investigation. But what he was 
admitting here was that the solution to historical problems, unlike physical ones, was 
not amenable to a quantitative solution. This may have been the “only difference” 
between the historical and the physical sciences, but it was a difference nonetheless. 
 This was where Taine introduced the idea of “force” as heuristic support. Why was 
a heuristic needed here? While the analogy between historical and physical problems 
appears to have been tantalising for Taine, it seems that given the lack of quantitative 
solvability of historical problems, which made them of a different kind than physical 
ones, along with the fact that the actual causes behind historical phenomena were 
unknown, it appeared justified, to Taine, to attribute a heuristic function to the physical 
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concept of force in order to proceed. Knowledge of the causal processes believed to be 
involved was incomplete. “But,” he wrote, “though the means of notation are not the 
same in the moral and physical sciences, yet as in both the matter is the same, equally 
made up of forces, magnitudes, and directions, we may say that in both the final result is 
produced after the same method” (1:14). In Taine’s view, then, there was the possibility 
of a methodological identity (not doctrinal) between the historical and physical sciences 
(not biological), despite differences in the nature of the phenomena each dealt with. 
This methodological identity was possible through Taine’s recognition of the use of a 
physical concept as heuristic support for his explanation, despite the tacit admission that 
the actual phenomena of historical causation remained unknown. 
 The criterion of heuristic support can usefully be applied here to evaluate the 
influence of Darwin on Taine. Let us consider the similarity between Taine’s and 
Darwin’s basic problems. 
 Darwin’s problem was biological: how to explain the causes of organic development 
and the relationship of varieties and species. How did Darwin address this problem? 
First, he appears to have accepted the that the causes lying behind variation and 
inheritance were themselves unobservable. There was no genetic theory, and Darwin 
had to find a heuristic to assist in his investigation. What he found was an analogy 
between the processes involved in domestic breeding and selection in nature. An 
anthropomorphic concept, “selection,” was adopted for its heuristic function, and 
became part of Darwin’s biological theory and his presentation of that theory. 
 Taine’s problem was historiographical: a matter of how to explain the causes of 
historical phenomena and the relationship of historical periods. How did Taine address 
this problem? First, he appears to have accepted that the causes lying behind historical 
phenomena were unobservable. Making direct observation impossible, this meant that 
Taine had to find a heuristic to assist in his historical investigation. What he found was 
an analogy between the methods of history and physics. A physical concept, “moment,” 
was adopted for its heuristic function, and became part of Taine’s historiographical 
method.11 
 
VI. Conclusion 
                                                     
11 It ought also be recalled that the mandate for Darwin’s analogical method came mainly from Herschel 
and Whewell, for both of whom the physical, Newtonian sciences were paradigmatic. Taine’s “force” 
 While the actual causes of historical phenomena remained unknown in 1863, when 
Taine published his History, the actual causes of biological evolution were equally 
unknown in 1859, when Darwin published the Origin. Wellek’s discussion, in its 
outright rejection of analogical arguments from science, overlooked completely this 
kind of similarity. Moreover, when Carroll resorts to interpreting or translating Taine’s 
terminology to show that Taine was a Darwinist after all, he does something wholly 
unnecessary to Taine. Hence I find that Wellek and Carroll have not adequately 
answered Morse Peckham’s charges of rejection or misinterpretation of Darwin.  
 While the heuristic support of analogical argument in science, condemned by 
Darwin’s contemporaries, became a commonplace in twentieth-century studies in the 
history and philosophy of science, this aspect of Darwin’s legacy has been poorly 
treated in literary discussions of Darwinism and evolution. The lesson here is that 
literary scholars dealing with scientific issues must make better use of specialist 
scholarship on scientific questions. 
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